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Abstract
In economies with Ramsey taxation, decreasing returns to scale, and private ownership,
we show that second-best production efficiency is desirable when profit tax rates vary
across groups of firms provided that the institutional rules which define profit incomes of
consumers depend on the distribution of profits across these groups of firms. The clas-
sic results of Dasgupta and Stiglitz [1972] (of firm-specific profit taxation) and Diamond
and Mirrlees [1971] and Guesnerie [1995] (of uniform one-hundred percent profit taxation)
follow as special cases of our model. Moreover, second-best analysis suggests the desir-
ability of proportionate taxation of inter-firm transactions in the absence of profit taxes.
Alternatively, it recommends profit taxation as a perfect substitute for intermediate-input
taxation. The analysis also suggests that, combined with the knowledge of the distribution
of profit incomes in the economy, profit taxation can promote both efficiency and redis-
tributive objectives of the government.
Journal of economic literature classification number: H21
Keywords: Ramsey taxation, private ownership, profit taxation, production inefficiency,
general equilibrium.
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Constraints on profit income distribution and production efficiency
in private ownership economies with Ramsey taxation
1. Introduction.
Diamond and Mirrlees (DM) [1971] revisited the problem first posed by Ramsey [1927]
about alternative policy instruments that can be employed when there are informational
constraints on the implementation of the second-welfare theorem. Using a general equilib-
rium model they showed that, when personalized lump-sum transfers are not available to
the government as redistributive devices, commodity (Ramsey) taxation can be employed
as an alternative, albeit second-best, means of redistribution. They showed that produc-
tion efficiency was desired by the second-best optimal commodity tax system and that
taxation of inter-firm transactions was not required.
The general equilibrium model they employed was one where technologies of firms
exhibited constant returns to scale. Thus, consumers received no profit incomes. An
extension of this model to decreasing returns to scale technologies (see e.g., Guesnerie
[1995] and Weymark [1979]) led to similar results regarding production efficiency when
private firms were subject to one-hundred percent profit taxation with the proceeds going
back to consumers as a uniform lump-sum transfer (also called a demogrant).1
To check the robustness of the result on second-best production efficiency under more
general settings, the DM model was extended to allow consumers to receive profit incomes
in proportion to the shares that they owned in the private firms.2 A series of papers
pioneered by Dasgupta and Stiglitz (DS) [1972] and followed up by Mirrlees [1972], Hahn
[1973], Sadka [1977], and Munk [1980] concluded that, in such models of privately owned
firms, second-best production efficiency continues to be desirable if the government can
implement firm-specific profit taxes. Challenges in the general proof of this result were
brought to light by these papers and, more recently, by Reinhorn [2010].
In general, the ability of the government to implement a firm-specific system of profit
taxation is questionable. More realistic scenarios, one could argue, may be those where
profit tax rates vary only across groups of private firms, i.e., the number of profit tax rates
the government can peg may be smaller than the number of private firms. Further, the
rigid institutional rules by which profit incomes are distributed among consumers may be
more general than the ones considered in the literature cited above. This paper extends
the above results in these directions.
In particular, we show that second-best production efficiency remains desirable when
profit tax rates can vary across groups of firms provided that the institutional rules which
1 For an excellent exposition of these results see Myles [1995].
2 As in a Arrow-Debreu private-ownership economy.
1
Production Efficiency and Private Shares September 26, 2010
define profit incomes of consumers depend on the distribution of profits across these groups
of firms. We show that all the previous results on second-best production efficiency follow
as special cases of our result. On one extreme is the DS case, which involves the finest
partition of the set of private firms–each firm-group in this partition comprises of a single
firm and hence the case of firm-specific profit taxation. On the other extreme is the DM and
Guesnerie [1995] case, which involves the coarsest partition of the set of private firms–only
one firm-group that contains all the firms and government implementing a single (uniform)
rate of profit taxation. Then there are cases that lie in between these two extremes.
Our strategy of proof is different from the earlier papers. Production inefficiency at a
tax equilibrium implies that the aggregate supply of the firms is not on the frontier of the
aggregate technology of the economy. With profit maximizing private and public-sector
firms, this implies that the producer price vectors faced by private and public firms in
such a tax equilibrium are not proportional, implying that there are differences in the
marginal rates of technical substitution across these two types of firms. Hence, an increase
in aggregate supply is technically feasible by reallocating production across these firms.
In fact, we show that, at such a tax equilibrium, there are changes in the price vectors
faced by private and public firms which will ensure that an increase in aggregate supply
is consistent with profit maximizing choices of firms at these new prices. Ceteris paribus,
such an increase in aggregate supply implies an increase in the aggregate income in the
economy. The question is can this increased aggregate income be distributed to consumers
in a manner that respects the existing institutional rules of income distribution in the
economy and improves the welfare of all consumers? In general, the institutional rules of
income distribution and the restrictions on the ability of the government to implement
profit taxation can constrain severely such welfare improvements. However, we show that
our institutional set-up that we described above permits the distribution of the increased
aggregate income across consumers in a welfare improving manner.
In our proof, we take recourse to an intermediate construct of an economy with
producer price vectors varying across (groups of) private-sector firms.3 Hence, implicitly,
this implies a wedge between price vectors faced by firms and, hence, the taxation of
transactions between firms are allowed. We show that this economy exhibits second-best
production efficiency, albeit, unlike in the DM model, this means that firms are subject
to proportionate rates of intermediate-input taxation. It is shown that the second-best
allocations of this economy are the same as those of an economy where all private firms
face the same price vector but are subject to profit taxes. This implies that second-
best equilibrium allocations with intermediate-input taxation can also be decentralized as
3 This is as in the earlier literature.
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second-best tax equilibrium allocations with no intermediate-input taxation but with firms
being subject to profit taxation.
The results on second-best production efficiency and intermediate-input taxation are
important for three reasons: Second-best production efficiency supports the use of pro-
ducer prices as the right proxies for the generally unobservable shadow prices for the cost-
benefit evaluation of public sector projects.4 The recommendation of either proportionate
intermediate-goods taxation or profit taxation with no intermediate-goods taxation min-
imizes also the practical administrative costs of implementing a system of Ramsey taxes,
e.g., it supports tax structures like VAT. Our analysis also suggests how, by understand-
ing the rules of profit income distribution in the economy, the government can potentially
design a system of profit taxation that can further both its redistributive and efficiency
objectives.
In Section 2, we lay out our general equilibrium model. We define two types of profit-
making economies–those with firm-group specific profit taxes and those with firm group
specific prices. In Section 3 we prove a preliminary lemma. In Section 4, we employ this
lemma to prove Theorem 1 that states that second-best production efficiency is desirable
in profit-making economies with firm-group specific prices. In Section 5, we obtain as
corollaries of Theorem 1 two results: one, the desirability of second-best production effi-
ciency in profit-making economies with firm-group specific profit taxes and two, the case
for either proportionate intermediate-input taxation in profit-making economies or profit
taxation with no intermediate goods taxation. In Section 6, we conclude.
2. The model.
There are N commodities indexed by k, H consumers indexed by h, and I + 1 firms
indexed by i. We denote the index set of consumers as H = {1, . . . , H} and the index set
of firms as I = {0, . . . , I}. We assume that firm 0 is a public sector firm, while all others
are private firms.
For every firm i ∈ I, the technology is denoted by Y i ⊂ RN . The aggregate technol-
ogy is Y =
∑
i Y
i.
For all h ∈ H, the gross consumption set of consumer h is Xh ⊆ RN+ and the
preferences over Xh are represented by continuous, quasi-concave, and locally nonsatiated
utility functions uh : Xh → R with images uh(xh). The endowment vector of consumer h
is denoted by eh ∈ RN+ .
Let E = ((Xh, uh, eh)h∈H, (Y
i)i∈I) denote the vector of economic fundamentals spec-
ified above.
4 See Little and Mirrlees [1974], Boadway [1975], and Dre´ze and Stern [1987].
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We assume that all firms are price-takers. For all i ∈ I define the set of prices for
which profit maximization is well defined as
Bi := {p ∈ RN+ \ {0
N}| p · y is bounded from above for all y ∈ Y i} (2.1)
and define the profit function πi : Bi → R with image
πi(p) = sup
yi
{p · yi| yi ∈ Y i}. (2.2)
The supply vectors of firm i ∈ I are obtained from the solution mapping of (2.2) as
yi : Bi → RN with image yi(p).5 For all i ∈ I define the frontier of Y i as
Yˆ i = {yi ∈ Y i| y¯i ≥ yi implies that y¯i /∈ Y i}. (2.3)
Similarly, we can define Yˆ as the frontier of the aggregate technology Y .
The vector of consumer prices is denoted by q ∈ RN+ . Income of every consumer h ∈ H
is denoted by mh ∈ R+. Let the mapping x
h : RN+ × R+ → R
N with image xh(q,mh)
denote the Marshallian demand vector of consumer h and let the mapping V h : RN+×R+ →
R with image V h(q,mh) be the corresponding indirect utility function. Every consumer
receives a demogrant, which is denoted by m ∈ R. The income of consumer h ∈ H in
economy E comprises of his endowment income, profit income that he receives from the
private firms, and the demogrant that he receives from the government. A partition of
I \{0} (the index set of all private sector firms) is denoted by P = {P1, . . . , PT}. Members
of a partition will be indexed by t or l.
2.1. A profit-making economy with firm-group specific profit taxes.
A profit-making economy with firm-group specific profit taxes is an economy derived
from E where the private firms are partitioned into various groups, the government can
implement profit taxation with the profit tax rates varying across firms depending on the
groups to which they belong, and the consumers receive profit incomes which depend on
the distribution of firm-group profits. If P = {P1, . . . , PT} is such a partition, then we
denote the vector of firm-group specific profit tax rates by τ = 〈τ1, . . . , τT 〉 ∈ RT , i.e., all
firms in each firm-group t = 1, . . . , T are subject to the same profit tax rate τ t so that the
net of tax profit of firm-group t is (1− τ t)
∑
i∈Pt
πi(p), which we denote in the definition
below by the function at. The profit incomes that consumers receive in such economies
assume the form below. The form is very general requiring only that profit incomes of
all consumers should add up to the total net of tax profits in the economy (condition (i)
in the definition below) and that the profit income received by each consumer should be
5 In general, yi(p) need not be a singleton set, i.e., the solution mapping yi(p) need not be a function.
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non-negative (condition (ii) in the definition below). Examples 1 to 3 below consider a
well-known functional form and some of its special cases that satisfy these conditions.
Definition. A map of profit incomes with firm-group specific profit taxes that is associated
with a partition P = {P1, . . . , PT} of I \ {0} is a continuous vector-valued map
rP,τ : R
T −→ RH (2.4)
with image 

r1 = r1P,τ ( a
1, . . . , aT )
...
rH = rHP,τ ( a
1, . . . , aT )

 , (2.5)
where a = 〈a1, . . . , aT 〉 is obtained as the vector-valued mapping a : RT ×∩i∈I\{0}B
i −→
RT with image 

a1(τ1, . . . , τT , p) = (1− τ1)
∑
i∈P1
πi(p)
...
aT (τ1, . . . , τT , p) = (1− τT )
∑
i∈PT
πi(p)

 (2.6)
such that
(i)
∑
h∈H r
h
P,τ
(
(1−τ1)
∑
i∈P1
πi(p) , . . . , (1−τT )
∑
i∈PT
πi(p)
)
=
∑
Pt∈P
(1−τ t)
∑
i∈Pt
πi(p)
and
(ii) for all h ∈ H, rhP,τ
(
(1− τ1)
∑
i∈P1
πi(p) , . . . , (1− τT )
∑
i∈PT
πi(p)
)
≥ 0.
Definition. Let E(E,P , rP,τ ) denote a profit-making economy with firm-group specific
profit taxes associated with a partition P = {P1, . . . , PT} of I \ {0} and a map of profit
incomes rP,τ . A tax equilibrium of E(E,P , rP,τ ) is a configuration 〈q, p, p
0, τ1, . . . , τT ,m〉 ∈
R3N+ ×R
T+1 such that6
∑
h∈H
xh(q,mh) ≤
T∑
t=1
∑
i∈Pt
yi((1− τ t)p) + y0(p0) +
∑
h∈H
eh and
mh = rhP,τ ((1− τ
1)
∑
i∈P1
πi(p), . . . , (1− τT )
∑
i∈PT
πi(p)) +m+ qeh, ∀ h ∈ H.
(2.8)
6 Vector notation: for x and y in Rn,
x ≥ y ⇔ xi ≥ yi, ∀i = 1, . . . , n,
x > y ⇔ x 6= y and xi ≥ yi, ∀i = 1, . . . , n,
x≫ y ⇔ xi > yi, ∀i = 1, . . . , n.
(2.7)
Also, recall that the income mh of each consumer h comprises of his profit income, endowment income,
and the demogrant received from the government.
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Some examples.
Consider the standard case where the profits are distributed to consumers according
to an exogeneous H×I-dimensional matrix of shares Θ with typical element θhi ≥ 0 which
denotes the share of consumer h in the profit of the private firm i. Thus, we require∑
h θ
h
i = 1 for all i ∈ I and h ∈ H. Let O denote the set of matrices Θ with these
properties.
Example 1. Let Θ ∈ O. If P =
{
{1}, . . . , {I}
}
(i.e., P is the finest partition of the set of
all private firms), then the map of profit incomes with firm-group specific profit taxes is
given by
rh = rhP,p((1−τ
1)π1(p), . . . , (1−τ I)πI(p)) = θh1 (1−τ
1)π1(p)+. . .+θhI (1−τ
I)πI(p), ∀ h ∈ H.
(2.9)
This is the DS case of firm-specific profit taxation.
Example 2. If Θ ∈ O is such that θhi = θ
h for all h ∈ H and i ∈ I \ {0}, then the coarsest
partition P of I \ {0} that can be used to define a map of profit incomes with firm-group
specific profit taxes is P = {I \ {0}} and the map of profit incomes is given by
rh = rhP,p((1− τ)
∑
i∈I\{0}
πi(p)) = θh(1− τ)
∑
i∈I
πi(p), ∀ h ∈ H. (2.10)
A special case of this example is θh = 1
H
and τ = 0. This is equivalent to the Guesnerie
[1995] and Weymark [1979] case, where the profits of all firms are subject to a uniform
(one-hundred percent) profit tax rate and the government returns its profit tax revenue as
a uniform lump-sum transfer to all consumers.7
Example 3. P = {P1, . . . , PT}. Let Θ ∈ O be such that θ
h
i = θ
ht for all h ∈ H, t = 1, . . . , T ,
and i ∈ Pt. Then, the map of profit incomes with firm-group specific profit taxes is given
by
rh = rhP,p(
∑
i∈P1
(1− τ1)πi(p), . . . ,
∑
i∈PT
(1− τT )πi(p))
= θh1(1− τ1)
∑
i∈P1
πi(p) + . . .+ θhT (1− τT )
∑
i∈PT
πi(p), ∀ h ∈ H.
(2.11)
This covers the case where government can implement more than a single but not quite
firm-specific profit tax rates, i.e., 0 < T < I, and where profit incomes of consumers
depend on distribution of profits in the T groups of firms.
7 This is also trivially the DM case where constant returns to scale is assumed, so that profits of firms
are zero.
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Definition. Let E(E,P , rP,τ ) be a profit-making economy with firm-group specific profit
taxes associated with a partition P = 〈P1, . . . , PT 〉 of I \ {0} and a map of profit incomes
rP,τ . A tax equilibrium 〈q, p, p
0, τ1, . . . , τT ,m〉 of E(E,P , rP,τ ) is a production efficient
tax equilibrium of E(E,P , rP,τ ) if
∑I
i=1 y
i(p) + y0(p0) ∈ Yˆ .
The second-best problem for E(E,P , rP,τ ) is to find the mapping VP,rP,τ : ∆H−1 → R
with image8
VP,rP,τ (s
1, . . . , sH) := max
q, p, p0, 〈τ1,...,τT 〉, m
∑
h
shV
h(q,mh)
subject to
〈q, p, p0, τ1, . . . , τT ,m〉 satisfying (2.8).
(2.12)
A solution to (2.12) is called a second-best tax equilibrium of E(E,P , rP,τ ).
Definition. A second-best tax equilibrium 〈∗q , ∗p, ∗p0, ∗τ 1, . . . , ∗τT , ∗m〉 of E(E,P , rP,τ ) is a
production efficient second-best if it is production efficient. If all second-best tax equilibria
of E(E,P , rP,τ ) are production efficient, then E(E,P , rP,τ ) exhibits second-best production
efficiency or production efficiency is desirable at the second-best of E(E,P , rP,τ ).
2.2. A profit-making economy with firm-group specific prices.
In this paper, we show that production efficiency is desirable at the second-best of
E(E,P , rP,τ ). To do so, we consider a more general institutional structure than a profit-
making economy with firm-group specific profit taxes. This is an economy with profit
incomes where the government can implement firm-group specific prices. We denote such
an economy by E(E,P , rP,p). The set of tax equilibrium allocations of E(E,P , rP,τ ) turns
out to be a subset of the set of tax equilibrium allocations of E(E,P , rP,p). Moreover,
we show in Section 4 that E(E,P , rP,p) exhibits second-best production efficiency. In
Section 5 we show that all the second-best tax equilibrium allocations of E(E,P , rP,p)
can be decentralized as tax equilibrium allocations of E(E,P , rP,τ ). The desirability of
production efficiency at the second-best of E(E,P , rP,τ ) will hence follow.
Let P = {P1, . . . , PT} be a partition of I \ {0}. For all t = 1, . . . , T , we denote
∩i∈PtB
i by Bt and the price vector faced by firm-group Pt is denoted by p
t ∈ RN+ .
Definition. A map of profit incomes with firm-group specific prices that is associated with
a partition P = {P1, . . . , PT} of I \ {0} is a continuous vector-valued map
rP,p : R
T −→ RH (2.13)
8 ∆H−1 is the H − 1-dimensional unit simplex in R
H . 〈s1, . . . , sH〉 ∈ ∆H−1 can be interpreted as
a vector of welfare weights attached to consumer utilities. The second-best utility possibility frontier is
obtained by solving the second-best optimization for all possible vectors of welfare weights.
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with image 

r1 = r1P,p( a
1, . . . , aT )
...
rH = rHP,p( a
1, . . . , aT )

 , (2.14)
where a = 〈a1, . . . , aT 〉 is obtained as the vector-valued mapping a :
∏T
t=1 Bt −→ R
T with
image 

a1(p1, . . . , pT ) =
∑
i∈P1
πi(p1)
...
aT (p1, . . . , pT ) =
∑
i∈PT
πi(pT )

 (2.15)
such that
(i)
∑
h∈H r
h
P,p(
∑
i∈P1
πi(p1) , . . . ,
∑
i∈PT
πi(pT )) =
∑
Pt∈P
∑
i∈Pt
πi(pt) and
(ii) for all h ∈ H, rhP,p(
∑
i∈P1
πi(p1) , . . . ,
∑
i∈PT
πi(pT )) ≥ 0.
Definition. Let E(E,P , rP,p) denote a profit-making economy with firm-group specific
prices associated with a partition P = {P1, . . . , PT} of I \ {0} and a map of profit
incomes rP,p. A tax equilibrium of E(E,P , rP,p) is a configuration 〈q, p
1, . . . , pT ,m〉 ∈
RN+ ×
∏T
t=1 Bt ×R such that
∑
h∈H
xh(q,mh) ≤
T∑
t=1
∑
i∈Pt
yi(pt) + y0(p0) +
∑
h∈H
eh and
mh = rhP,p(
∑
i∈P1
πi(p1), . . . ,
∑
i∈PT
πi(pT )) +m+ qeh, ∀ h ∈ H.
(2.16)
As in the previous section we can define an efficient tax equilibrium of economy
E(E,P , rP,p). Note that the system of equations (2.16) is homogeneous of degree zero in
in p1, . . . , pT , q, and m and is homogeneous of degree zero in p0. Hence, it admits two
normalization rules.9 Under the maintained assumptions on consumers’ preferences, the
budget constraints hold as equalities under utility maximization, that is, for all h, we have
q · xh(q,mh) = mh. (2.17)
To show that at a tax equilibrium of E(E,P , rP,p), the government budget is balanced, we
multiply both sides of the first part (a vector of inequalities) of (2.16) by q and employ
9 For example, we can adopt the normalization rules p11 = 1 and p
0
1 = 1.
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(2.17) to obtain
q ·
∑
h
xh(q,mh) ≤ q ·
T∑
t=1
∑
i∈Pt
yi(pt) + q · y0(p0) + q ·
∑
h∈H
eh
⇒
T∑
t=1
∑
i∈Pt
πi(pt) +Hm+ q ·
∑
h∈H
eh ≤
T∑
t=1
∑
i∈Pt
pt · yi(pt) + q · y0(p0) +
T∑
t=1
∑
i∈Pt
[q − pt] · yi(pt) + q ·
∑
h∈H
eh
⇒ Hm ≤
T∑
t=1
∑
i∈Pt
[q − pt] · yi(pt) + q · y0(p0)
⇒ m ≤
∑T
t=1
∑
i∈Pt
[q − pt] · yi(pt) + q · y0(p0)
H
⇒ m ≤
∑T
t=1
∑
i∈Pt
[q − pt] · yi(pt) + [q − p0] · y0(p0) + p0 · y0(p0)
H
.
(2.18)
Condition (2.18), which is an implication of Walras law, says that the demogrant is financed
from the government’s revenue from indirect taxation and the sale of publicly produced
goods to the consumers.
The second-best problem for E(E,P , rP,p) is to find the mapping VP,rP,p : ∆H−1 → R
with image
VP,rP,p(s
1, . . . , sH) := max
q, p0, 〈p1,...,pT 〉, m
∑
h
shV
h(q,mh)
subject to
〈q, p0, p1, . . . , pT ,m〉 satisfying (2.16).
(2.19)
A solution to (2.19) is called a second-best tax equilibrium of E(E,P , rP,p). As in the previ-
ous section we can define a production efficient second-best tax equilibrium of E(E,P , rP,p)
and the desirability of production efficiency at the second-best of E(E,P , rP,p).
3. A preliminary lemma.
Assumptions 1 and 2 stated below are regularity assumptions on the technologies of
firms. They are similar to the ones employed in the previous literature on this topic.
Assumption 1. For all i ∈ I, Y i is closed, convex, contains 0, is not a cone, and satisfies
Y i +RN− ⊂ Y
i.
9
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Assumption 2. For all i ∈ I, the set Bi is non-empty and there exists ρ ∈ RN++ ∩B
i.
Assumption 1 excludes firms that exhibit constant returns-to-scale. This exclusion
seems without loss of generality as these firms are associated with zero profits and hence
the presence of such firms offers no constraints on the distribution of profits in the economy
(the issue of focus in this paper). Note that under Assumptions 1 and 2, for all i, πi is
continuous, non-negative valued, linearly homogeneous, and convex on the set Bi.
Let E(E,P , rP,p) denote a profit-income economy with firm-group specific prices as-
sociated with a partition P = {P1, . . . , PT} of I \ {0}. For all t = 1, . . . , T and p
t ∈ Bt,
we denote the supply of firms in Pt ∈ P as y
t(pt), i.e., yt(pt) =
∑
i∈Pt
yi(pt). For all
t = 1, . . . , T , the frontier of Y t =
∑
i∈Pt
Y i is denoted by Yˆ t.10
Let 〈p1, . . . , pT 〉 ∈
∏T
t=1 Bt and p
0 ∈ B0. Assumption 3 (below) restricts our analysis
(which we claim is without loss of generality11) to the case of technologies with smooth
frontiers.
Remark 1 (below) presents the well-known fact that, under our assumptions, the
vector of aggregate supply
∑T
t=1 y
t(pt)+ y0(p0) lies in Yˆ if the price vectors p0, . . . , pT are
proportional.
Lemma 1 shows that if there exist t, t′ ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T} such that pt and pt
′
are not
proportional,12 then there exist changes in price vectors faced by firms in groups t and t′
that can strictly increase the aggregate supply (i.e., lead to a higher aggregate supply than∑T
l=1 y
l(pl) + y0(p0)) given the profit maximizing behavior of our price-taking firms and,
hence,
∑T
l=1 y
l(pl)+ y0(p0) is not in Yˆ . Before formally stating Lemma 1, we first present
two examples to illustrate the point made in this lemma. Example 4 (below) considers the
case of smooth production frontiers, while Example 5 shows that the argument extends to
the non-smooth case. In both the examples, it is assumed that N = 2, there is no public
production, I = 2, and P =
{
{1}, {2}
}
. Good two is the output and good one is the
input of these firms, so that if y = 〈y1, y2〉 ∈ R
2 is a production vector, then y2 ≥ 0 and
y1 ≤ 0. Let us also denote a hyperplane with normal p and constant a by H(p, a) and its
lower and strictly lower half-spaces by H≤(p, a) and H<(p, a), respectively. Similarly we
can define the upper and strictly upper half-spaces of H(p, a).
10 Note the slight abuse of notation: the technology, its frontier, and a production vector corresponding
to any firm i ∈ I are denoted by Y i, Yˆ i, and yi, respectively, while the aggregate technology, its frontier,
and a production vector obtained by summing over all firms in Pt for t = 1, . . . , T are denoted by Y
t, Yˆ t,
and yt, respectively. However, in what follows, it will be clear always whether we are referring to a firm
in I or to a group of firms Pt.
11 We defend this claim with an example below.
12 Or, in the non-smooth case, if the sets of support prices of yt(pt) and yt
′
(pt
′
) do not intersect.
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Example 4. Suppose technology of Firm 1 is Y 1 = {y1 ∈ R2| y12 ≤ (−y
1
1)
1
2} and Y 2 =
{y2 ∈ R2| y22 ≤ (−y
2
1)
1
3}. Suppose Firms 1 and 2 face price vectors p1 = 〈1, 1
2
〉 and
p2 = 〈1,
1
12
〉, respectively. It can be verified that the profit maximizing production vector
of Firm 1 will be y1(p1) = 〈−1, 1〉, while that of Firm 2 will be y2(p2) = 〈−8, 2〉. Since p1
and p2 are not proportional, it is well-known (and can be easily verified) that the aggregate
production vector y := y1(p1) + y2(p2) = 〈−9, 3〉 must lie in the interior of Y := Y 1 + Y 2.
In fact, at these production vectors, the marginal productivity of input in Firm 1 is 2,
which is less than the marginal productivity of input equal to 12 in Firm 2. This suggests
that reallocating some of the input from Firm 1 to Firm 2 will result in an increase in the
aggregate output. The question is whether there exist such reallocations which can also
be supported as profit maximization choices of firms. We show below that this is true.
Since p1 and p2 are not collinear, Figure 1 shows that there exist changes ∆y1 =
〈1
2
,−2〉 and ∆y2 = 〈−1
4
, 5
2
〉 in production vectors of Firms 1 and 2, respectively, such
that p1 · ∆y1 and p2 · ∆y2 are non-positive and the aggregate change in production is
positive, i.e., ∆y = ∆y1 + ∆y2 = 〈1
4
, 1
2
〉 ≫ 0. In particular, as seen in the figure,
∆y1 ∈ H≤(p
1, 1) ∩H>(p
2, 0). Similarly ∆y2 ∈ H≤(p
2, 0) ∩H>(p
1, 0).13
Note however, that such changes may not be technologically feasible, e.g., for Firm
2, y2(p2) + ∆y2 = 〈−8.25, 4.5〉 and 4.5 > (8.25)
1
3 . Nevertheless, Figure 2 shows that ∆y2
can be suitably scaled so that it becomes technologically feasible with respect to Y 2, e.g.,
y¯2 := y2(p2) + 1
3.32347
∆y2 = 〈−2.482, 1.354〉 lies in Yˆ 2. By scaling down ∆y2 further, we
obtain points that lie on the line segment joining y¯2 and y2(p2). Each such point, when
added to y1(p1) + ∆y1, results in higher aggregate output that y. For any such point
that lies in the interior of of Y 2, Figure 2 shows that there exist production points in the
frontier Yˆ 2 that are bigger. Since these points are on the frontier, there will exist producer
prices that support them as profit maximizing choices for the private-sector. p2
ν1 and p2
ν2
are two such price vectors. In fact, a sequence of such price vectors {p2
ν
} converging to
p2 can be constructed.14 A similar sequence of price vectors for firm 1 {p1
ν
} converging
to p1 can also be constructed using ∆ y1. It is clear from such a construction that, for all
ν, we will have y1(p1
ν
) + y2(p2
ν
)≫ y.
Example 5. Suppose technology of Firms 1 and 2 are (see also Figure 3)
Y 1 = {y1 ∈ R2| y12 ≤ 5(−y
1
1), 0 ≤ (−y
1
1) ≤ 1
≤ 3 + 2(−y11), (−y
1
1) ≥ 1}, and
(3.1)
13 Note that these changes imply reducing the input usage of Firm 1 and increasing the input usage of
Firm 2.
14 For example, these can be support vectors for a sequence of production vectors converging to y2(p2)
and lying on the part of the frontier Yˆ 2 that is on the left of y2(p2).
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Y 2 = {y2 ∈ R2| y22 ≤ 3(−y
2
1), 0 ≤ (−y
2
1) ≤ 4
≤ 8 + (−y21), (−y
2
1) ≥ 4},
(3.2)
so that the aggregate technology is
Y = {y ∈ R2| y2 ≤ 5(−y1), 0 ≤ (−y1) ≤ 1,
≤ 2 + 3(−y1), 1 ≤ (−y1) ≤ 5
≤ 7 + 2(−y1), (−y1) ≥ 5}.
(3.3)
Any production vector y such that y = y1+y2 where y1 ∈ Yˆ 1 and y2 ∈ Yˆ 2 lies in Yˆ if and
only if the sets of support prices of y1 and y2 have a non-empty intersection, e.g., consider
y = 〈−5, 17〉 ∈ Yˆ , y1 = 〈−1, 5〉 ∈ Yˆ 1, and y2 = 〈−4, 12〉 ∈ Yˆ 2. The set of support prices
of y1 is (see Figure 3)
ρ1(y1) = {p ∈ R2+| p = λ1〈5, 1〉+ λ2〈2, 1〉, ∀λ1 ≥ 0, λ2 ≥ 0} (3.4)
and the set of support prices of y2 is
ρ2(y2) = {p ∈ R2+| p = λ1〈3, 1〉+ λ2〈1, 1〉, ∀λ1 > 0, λ2 > 0}. (3.5)
It is clear that ρ1(y1) ∩ ρ2(y2) 6= ∅.
Suppose Firms 1 and 2 face price vectors p1 = 〈2, 1〉 and p2 = 〈1, 1〉 and suppose
Firms 1 and 2 choose bundles y¯1 = 〈−6, 15〉 ∈ y1(p1) and y¯2 = 〈−5, 13〉 ∈ y2(p2) as
their profit maximizing choices. (See Figure 3.) The set of support prices ρ1(y¯1) is the
set of all (non-zero) prices proportional to the vector p1 = 〈2, 1〉, while the set of support
prices ρ2(y¯2) is the set of all (non-zero) prices proportional to the vector p2 = 〈1, 1〉. It
is clear that ρ1(y¯1) ∩ ρ2(y¯2) = ∅ and, hence, y¯ = y¯1 + y¯2 = 〈−11, 28〉 does not lie in
Yˆ . If the price vector faced by Firm 2 is changed to p˜2 = p1, while the price vector
faced by Firm 1 is unchanged, then the profit maximizing choice of Firm 2 changes to
y2(p˜2) = y˜2 = y2 = 〈−4, 12〉 ∈ Yˆ 2. For Firm 1, both the bundles y˜1 = 〈−6.8, 16.6〉 and y¯1
lie in y1(p1) (see Figure 3). If Firm 1 can be made to change its profit maximizing choice
to y˜1 from y¯1, then the new aggregate supply vector is y˜ = 〈−10.8, 28.6〉, which is strictly
bigger than y¯.
Assumption 3 below will be made to restrict our analysis to the case of smooth and
strictly convex technologies.15 Though the examples above illustrate the generality of
the conclusion of Lemma 1 for convex, smooth, and non-smooth production technologies,
the apparatus required to prove the non-smooth case is more elaborate, while it will add
nothing new to the general intuition.16
15 The restriction to strictly convex technologies implies that the supply mappings of firms are functions.
16 The general non-smooth and convex case will require working, for example, with normal and tangent
cones (see, e.g., Rockafellar [1978] and Cornet [1989]) to define the cones of support prices for points on
the frontiers of the technology sets.
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Assumption 3. For all i ∈ I, there exist smooth and strictly quasi-convex functions
f i : RN → R with images f i(y) such that Y i = {y ∈ RN | f i(y) ≤ 0}.17
Remark 1. Let Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 hold and let P = {P1, . . . , PT} be a partition of
I \{0}. Suppose pt ∈ Bt for all t = 1, . . . , T and p
0 ∈ B0. If p0, p1, . . . , pT are proportional
to each other then
∑T
t=1 y
t(pt) + y0(p0) ∈ Yˆ .18
Lemma 1: Suppose Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 hold and let P = {P1, . . . , PT} be a partition
of I \ {0}. Suppose p¯t ∈ Bt for all t = 1, . . . , T and p¯
0 ∈ B0. Suppose there exist
t, t′ ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T} such that p¯t is not proportional to p¯t
′
. Let y¯ :=
∑T
l=0 y
l(p¯l). Then there
exist sequences {pt
v
} → p¯t and {pt
′v
} → p¯t
′
and an integer vˆ such that
∑
l 6=t,t′ y
l(p¯l) +
yt(pt
v
) + yt
′
(pt
′v
)≫ y¯ for all v > vˆ.
4. Desirability of production efficiency at the second-best of a profit-making
economy with firm-group specific prices.
The following theorem proves that production efficiency is desirable at any second-
best of a profit-making economy with firm-group specific prices. Conditions (a) and (b)
of the theorem ensure that local Pareto nonsatiation, as defined in Hahn [1973], always
holds. In particular, condition (b) is the DM version of local Pareto nonsatiation, i.e.,
there exists a good that is in positive (or negative) net demand by all consumers.19
Theorem 1: Suppose E(E,P , rP,p) is a profit-making economy with firm-group specific
prices associated with a partition P = {P1, . . . , PT} of I \{0} and a map of profit incomes
rP,p. Let Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 hold. Suppose either
(a) there exists h such that uh is strictly monotonic or
(b) there exists a commodity k and a consumer h′ ∈ H such that
(i) xh
′
k (q,m
h′)−eh
′
k > 0 and x
h
k(q,m
h)−ehk ≥ 0, ∀ h ∈ H, q ∈ R
N
+ , and m
h′ ,mh ∈ R
or
(ii) xh
′
k (q,m
h′)−eh
′
k < 0 and x
h
k(q,m
h)−ehk ≤ 0, ∀ h ∈ H, q ∈ R
N
+ , and m
h′ ,mh ∈ R
holds. Then production efficiency is desirable at the second-best of E(E,P , rP,p).
17 A function f : RN → R is smooth if it is C∞, i.e., its partial derivatives of all orders exist. Note
that under Assumptions 1 and 2, the set Y i has a functional representation for all i ∈ I. Assumption 3
only ensures that this functional representation is smooth and strictly quasi-convex.
18 This follows from Koopmans’ well-known result on interchangeability of set summation and optimiza-
tion. In the non-smooth case, this generalizes to the sets of support prices of y0(p0), y1(p1), . . . , yT (pT )
having a non-empty intersection.
19 See Weymark [1978] for a generalization of condition (b).
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Proof: Define P0 = {0} so that {P0, P1, . . . , PT} is a partition of I. Suppose s¯ :=
〈q¯, p¯1, . . . , p¯T , m¯〉 ∈ RN+T+1 is a solution to (2.12) but y¯ :=
∑T
t=0 y
t(p¯t) /∈ Yˆ . Remark 1
implies that there exist t, t′ ∈ {0, . . . , T} such that p¯t
′
6= κp¯t for any κ ≥ 0.
Step 1: We show that, starting from p¯t and p¯t
′
, there exist changes in producer prices of
firm-groups t and t′ which lead to an aggregate supply greater than y¯.
This is true because Lemma 1 demonstrates that there exist sequences {pt
v
} → p¯t
and {pt
′v
} → p¯t
′
such that yt(pt
v
) + yt
′
(pt
′v
) ≫ yˆ for all v > vˆ, where vˆ is defined as in
Lemma 1.
This implies that the aggregate income or the value of aggregate output measured
using consumer prices q¯ increases when producer prices p¯t and p¯t
′
change to pt
v
and pt
′v
for all v > vˆ, that is,
Mv = q¯ · [
∑
l 6=t,t′
yl(p¯l) + yt(pt
v
) + yt
′
(pt
′v
)] > q¯ · y¯ =: M¯, ∀v > vˆ. (4.1)
Step 2: We show that there exists a ∗v > vˆ, two scalars λt ≥ 0 and λt
′
≥ 0 and two new
price vectors for firm-groups t and t′ defined by ∗pt := λtpt
∗v
and ∗pt
′
:= λt
′
pt
′
∗v
such that,
for all h ∈ H, the profit incomes defined at the old and new price vectors do not change,
i.e.,20
∗rh := rhP,p
(
(
∑
i∈Pl
πi(p¯l))l 6=t,t′ ,
∑
i∈Pt
πi(∗pt),
∑
i∈Pt
πi(∗pt
′
)
)
= rhP,p(
∑
i∈P1
πi(p¯1) , . . . ,
∑
i∈PT
πi(p¯T ) ) =: r¯h.
(4.2)
The continuity of the profit functions πi implies that
∑
i∈Pt
πi(pt
v
) →
∑
i∈Pt
πi(p¯t). If∑
i∈Pt
πi(p¯t) = 0 then choose any ǫ > 0. If
∑
i∈Pt
πi(p¯t) > 0 then choose ǫ such that 0 <
ǫ <
∑
i∈Pt
πi(p¯t). Then, there exists vt such that for all v > vt we have |
∑
i∈Pt
πi(pt
v
)−∑
i∈Pt
πi(p¯t)| < ǫ. Our choice of ǫ implies that, for every v > vt, the sign of
∑
i∈Pt
πi(pt
v
)
is the same as the sign of
∑
i∈Pt
πi(p¯t): if
∑
i∈Pt
πi(p¯t) = 0 then
∑
i∈Pt
πi(pt
v
) ≥ 0 and if∑
i∈Pt
πi(p¯t) > 0 then
∑
i∈Pt
πi(pt
v
) > 0. Similarly, we can define vt
′
.
20 If any one of t or t′ is 0, say t′, then pit
′
will not be an argument of the income map rP,p.
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Pick ∗v to be any v > max{vt, vt
′
, vˆ}. Choose scaling factors λt and λt
′
such that
λt
∑
i∈Pt
πi(pt
∗v
) =
∑
i∈Pt
πi(p¯t) and
λt
′ ∑
i∈Pt′
πi(pt
′
∗v
) =
∑
i∈Pt′
πi(p¯t
′
).
(4.3)
This is possible, e.g., if
∑
i∈Pt
πi(p¯t) = 0, then λt = 0 needs to be chosen. If
∑
i∈Pt
πi(p¯t) >
0, then λt is given by
λt =
∑
i∈Pt
πi(p¯t)
∑
i∈Pt
πi(pt
∗v)
, (4.4)
which is well defined as
∑
i∈Pt
πi(pt
∗v
) 6= 0. (Note, λt ≥ 0 and λt
′
≥ 0.) Then (4.2) follows
from (4.3) and the linear homogeneity of the profit functions. Thus, the profit incomes of
individual consumers do not change when p¯t and p¯t
′
change to ∗pt and and ∗pt
′
.
Step 3: We show that Step 2 implies that the move to ∗pt, ∗pt
′
results in no change in the
aggregate profit income generated in the economy and that this implies that the increase
in aggregate income from M¯ to M
∗v must show up as an increase in the government’s tax
revenue.
Summing (4.2) over all h and including the profits of the public sector, we obtain21
∑
l 6=t,t′
∑
i∈Pl
πi(p¯l) +
∑
i∈Pt
πi(∗pt) +
∑
i∈Pt′
πi(∗pt
′
) =
T∑
l=0
∑
i∈Pl
πi(p¯l). (4.5)
Thus, the aggregate profits of firms do not change when p¯t and p¯t
′
change to ∗pt and and
∗pt
′
. Define ∗yt := yt(∗p
t
), and ∗yt
′
:= yt
′
(∗p
t′
).
M
∗v =:
∗
M = q¯ · [
∑
l 6=t,t′
yl(p¯l) + ∗yt + ∗yt
′
]
=
∑
l 6=t,t′
[(q¯ − p¯l) · yl(p¯l)] + [q¯ − ∗pt] · ∗yt + [q¯ − ∗pt
′
] · ∗yt
′
+
∑
l 6=t,t′
p¯l · yl(p¯l) + ∗pt · ∗yt + ∗pt
′
· ∗yt
′
=
∑
l 6=t,t′
[(q¯ − p¯l) · yl(p¯l)] + [q¯ − ∗pt] · ∗yt + [q¯ − ∗pt
′
] · ∗yt
′
+
∑
l 6=t,t′
∑
i∈Pl
πi(p¯l) +
∑
i∈Pt
πi(∗pt) +
∑
i∈Pt′
πi(∗pt
′
)
(4.6)
21 Note that this is true for both cases: (i) both t and t′ are not equal to 0 and (ii) one of t or t′ is 0.
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Similarly,
M¯ =
T∑
l=0
[(q¯ − p¯l) · yl(p¯l)] +
T∑
l=0
∑
i∈Pl
πi(p¯l). (4.7)
Since
∗
M−M¯ > 0, it follows from (4.5) that the government’s revenue from commodity
taxes is higher when we move to ∗pt, ∗pt
′
keeping consumer prices and producer prices for
the firm groups other than t and t′ unchanged, that is,
∗
G :=
∑
l 6=t,t′
[(q¯ − p¯l) · yl(p¯l)] + [q¯ − ∗pt] · ∗yt + [q¯ − ∗pt
′
] · ∗yt
′
>
T∑
l=1
[(q¯ − p¯l) · yl(p¯l)] =: G¯.
(4.8)
Step 4: We show that the increase in the government’s revenue can be used to construct
another tax equilibrium where utility of at least one consumer is higher, with no loss in
utility for the others: this is obtained by either increasing the demogrant by an appropriate
amount (this is possible if (a) holds) or by decreasing (increasing) the consumer price of,
and hence the tax on, the kth commodity by an appropriate amount (this is possible if b(i)
(b(ii)) holds).
For all h define xh(q¯, r¯h+m¯+ q¯ ·eh) =: x¯h,
∑
h x¯
h =: x¯, and e :=
∑h eh. (4.2) implies
that for all h, x¯h = xh(q¯, ∗rh+m¯+q¯·eh). Since x¯ ≤ y¯+e≪
∑
l 6=t,t′ y
l(p¯l)+∗yt+∗yt
′
+e =: ∗y+e,
we have x¯ ∈ {∗y + e}+RN−−.
Since xh is a continuous function of qk for all h, clearly, if condition b(i) or b(ii) hold,
we can apply the DM argument to find ∗q := 〈q¯−k,
∗q k〉 and
∗ǫ such that (1)
∑
h x
h(∗q , ∗rh +
m¯ + ∗q · eh)) =:
∑
h
∗xh ∈ N∗ǫ (x¯) ⊂ {
∗y + e} +RN−− and (2) u
h(∗xh) ≥ uh(x¯h) for all h and
uh(∗xh) > uh(x¯h) for some h.22 This implies that ∗s := 〈∗q , (p¯l)l 6=t,t′ ,
∗pt, ∗pt
′
, m¯〉 is another
tax equilibrium configuration of E(E,P , rP,p) that Pareto dominates s¯.
23 This contradicts
the fact that s¯ is a solution to (2.12).
If condition (a) holds, then we can exploit the continuity of xh in m for all h to find
mˆ > m¯ and ǫˆ such that (1)
∑
h x
h(q¯, ∗rh+ mˆ+ q¯ · eh)) =:
∑
h xˆ
h ∈ N∗ǫ (x¯) ⊂ {
∗y− e}+RN−−
and (2) uh(xˆh) ≥ uh(x¯h) for all h and uh(∗xh) > uh(x¯h) for some h.24 This again leads to
a tax equilibrium that Pareto dominates s¯, which once again contradicts the hypothesis
of the theorem.25
22 Note, this implies reducing (increasing) the consumer price on commodity k that every one likes and
has a non-negative net demand (dislikes and has a non-positive net demand).
23 Note that it is always possible to make the new tax equilibrium configuration conform to the normal-
ization rules adopted, e.g., if the normalization rules are p11 = 1 and p
0
1 = 1 and if t 6= 1, 0 and t
′ 6= 1, 0,
then divide 〈∗q , (p¯l)l 6=t,t′,0,
∗pt, ∗pt
′
, m¯〉 by p¯11 and p¯
0 by p¯01.
24 Note, this is made possible by the fact that
∗
G > G¯ in (4.8), so that it is possible to distribute all or
a part of this increased government budget-surplus as a higher demogrant.
25 Once again, the new tax equilibrium can be reconfigured to conform to our normalization rules.
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5. Corollaries of Theorem 1:
Two results follow as corollaries of Theorem 1.
Corollary 1 of Theorem 1: Production efficiency is desirable at the second-best of a
profit-making economy with firm-group specific profit taxes.
Proof:
Step 1: We show that the set of tax equilibrium allocations of E(E,P , rP,τ ) is a subset of
the set of tax equilibrium allocations of E(E,P , rP,p).
Let α¯τ := 〈q¯, p¯, p¯
0, τ¯1, . . . , τ¯T , m¯〉 be a tax equilibrium of a profit-making econ-
omy with firm-group specific profit taxes E(E,P , rP,τ ) associated with a partition P =
{P1, . . . , PT} of I\{0} and a map of profit incomes rP,τ . Define α¯p := 〈q¯, p¯
0, p¯1, . . . , p¯T , m¯〉
with p¯t := (1 − τ¯ t)p¯ for all t = 1, . . . , T . Let E(E,P , rP,p) be a profit-making economy
with firm-group specific prices, where26
rP,p(a) = rP,τ (a). (5.1)
For all t = 1, . . . , T , the linear homogeneity of the profit function implies
∑
i∈Pt
πi(p¯t) =
(1− τ¯ t)
∑
i∈Pt
πi(p¯), and for all h ∈ H, we have
rhP,p(
∑
i∈P1
πi(p¯1), . . . ,
∑
i∈PT
πi(p¯T ) ) = rhP,τ ( (1− τ¯
1)
∑
i∈P1
πi(p¯), . . . , (1− τ¯T )
∑
i∈PT
πi(p¯) ).
(5.2)
This implies that α¯p is a tax equilibrium of E(E,P , rP,p) that results in the same allocation
as α¯τ in economy E(E,P , rP,τ ).
Step 2: We show that every second-best of E(E,P , rP,p) can be decentralized as a tax
equilibrium of E(E,P , rP,τ ).
Theorem 1 implies that if 〈q, p0, p1, . . . , pT ,m〉 is a second-best of E(E,P , rP,p), then
there exist positive scalars λ2, . . . , λT such that pt = λtp1 for all t = 2, . . . , T . Choose
p = p1, τ1 = 0, and τ t = 1− λt for all t = 2, . . . , T . Then 〈q, p, p0, τ1, . . . , τT ,m〉 is a tax
equilibrium of E(E,P , rP,τ ).
Steps 1 and 2 imply that production efficiency is desirable at the second-best of
E(E,P , rP,τ ).
27
Corollary 2 of Theorem 1: If profit taxes cannot be implemented then intermediate-
inputs should be taxed proportionately. Alternatively, firm-specific profit taxation justifies
not taxing inter-firm transactions in profit making economies.
26 Recall the definitions of maps of profit incomes for firm-group specific profit taxes and firm-group
specific prices in Sections 2.
27 Of course, this follows under the conditions laid down in Theorem 1 as translated to economy
E(E,P, rP,τ ).
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Proof: Consider a profit-making economy with firm-group specific prices E(E,P , rP,p).
Let P be a partition of I \ {0}. Thus, the government can implement firm-group specific
prices in such an economy. This means that non-zero wedges are allowed between price
vectors faced by any two groups of private firms in this economy, e.g., pt−pt
′
is the wedge
between the price vectors pt ∈ RN+ and p
t′ ∈ RN+ faced by private firms in firm-groups t and
t′, respectively. Thus, transactions that happen between these two groups of private firms
are effectively taxed. Thus, this economy permits a very general system of intermediate
input taxation. Theorem 1 demonstrates, however, that at the second-best of such an
economy producer prices are proportional to each other, e.g., if 〈q, p0, p1, . . . , pT ,m〉 is a
second-best of E(E,P , rP,p), then there exist positive scalars λ
2, . . . , λT such that pt = λtp1
for all t = 2, . . . , T , where p1 is the price vector for firms in group 1. Thus, the wedge
between price vectors of firm-groups t and t′ at this second-best is p1(λt−λt
′
). Transactions
in commodities between these two firm-groups are, hence, taxed proportionately at a rate
λt− λt
′
. Alternatively, from Corollary 1 of Theorem 1 (above) it follows that this second-
best can be decentralized as a second-best tax equilibrium of a profit-making economy
with firm-group specific profit taxes. But this precludes intermediate goods taxation as
all firm-groups face the same producer price p1 in this economy. Rather, firm-groups are
subject to firm-group specific profit tax rates τ t = 1− λt for all t = 1, . . . , T . It is in this
sense that Corollary 2 of Theorem 1 follows.
As a special case, the famous implication with regards to intermediate input taxation
for DM and Guesnerie [1995] models follows:28 If government can implement one-hundred
percent profit taxation and redistribute proceeds to consumers as a demogrant, then in-
termediate input taxation is not desirable.
6. Conclusions.
There is a classic literature that studies the desirability of production efficiency in
economies with Ramsey taxation where firms make positive profits which can potentially
be partly taxed away and partly distributed back to consumers. The results of this classic
literature are often invoked to justify the use of producer prices as proxies for shadow
prices in cost-benefit tests of marginal public sector projects. We show that the desirabil-
ity of second-best production efficiency depends on the link between the constraints on
government’s profit taxation power and the institutional rules by which (profit) incomes
are distributed in the economy. We generalize results in the literature by showing that
second-best production efficiency is desirable whenever firms can be organized into groups
such that (i) profit tax rates vary across these groups and (ii) consumer incomes depend on
28 Recall, this case is equivalent to the case where P is the coarsest partition of private firms, i.e.,
P = {I \ {0}} and θhi =
1
H
for all h and i ∈ I \ {0}.
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the distribution of profits across these groups. Thus, the fewer (larger) the number of firm-
groups, the lesser (more) are the profit tax rates that are required to ensure second-best
production efficiency. The two cases studied in the literature of firm-specific and uniform
(e.g., one-hundred percent) profit taxation follow as two special cases of our general result.
The result follows because, at any production inefficient status-quo of such economies,
the private sector producer price vector and the prices in the public sector (the latter re-
flect the true shadow prices in the economy) are not proportional. The differences in the
marginal rates of substitution in the private and public sectors imply that production
can be reallocated between these sectors to increase aggregate output and income in the
economy. Lemma 1 proves that, in an institutional structure where producers are price
takers and maximize profits, small changes in the two price vectors can be constructed
that ensure that this potential increase in the aggregate output can be supported as profit
maximizing choices of firms. The continuity and linear homogeneity of the profit func-
tion imply that by implementing firm-group specific profit taxation, the government can
effectively implement further (but proportionate) changes in producer prices that ensure
that the net of tax firm-group profits, and hence the profit incomes of the consumers that
depend on the distribution of the firm-group profits, remain at the status-quo levels, while
at the same time there are no further changes in the (increased) supply by firms. This
must mean that the increase in aggregate income shows up as an increase in the tax and
public sector incomes of the government, which can be used to change commodity taxes
or to increase demogrant incomes of people in a Pareto improving way. Thus, there are
always Pareto improvements at any production inefficient status-quo of such economies.
The mechanism suggests why this strategy does not work, generally, in most private
ownership economies when restrictions on profit taxation are not consistent with the rules
of income distribution as outlined above in (i) and (ii). This is because, while a production
inefficient status-quo suggests that there are changes in producer prices that can increase
the aggregate output in the economy, any attempt by the government to change profit
tax rates to maintain net of tax profits at the status-quo levels, may not translate into
maintaining profit incomes of the consumers at the status-quo levels. Thus, all of the
increased output may not, in general, become available to the government for designing
Pareto improving changes in taxes and demogrant. Private ownership diverts some of the
increased resources from the government coffers and puts it into the hands of consumers
as profit incomes. But the private ownership structure could be such that it may lead to
an inequitable distribution of profit incomes and a decrease in welfare of some consumers,
which no government policy may be able to correct with the remaining resources, that
is, there may exist no directions of change in the government policy instruments that
are Pareto-improving, equilibrium preserving, and compatible with the existing private
ownership structure. Our analysis hence suggests how, by understanding the rules of
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profit income distribution in the economy, the government can potentially design profit
taxation that can promote both its redistributive and efficiency objectives.
We also show that in economies with Ramsey taxation where consumers also receive
profit incomes, proportionate intermediate input taxation is recommended in the absence
of profit taxation. Alternatively, profit taxation is a perfect substitute for intermediate
input taxation. The classic result of DM (extended as in Guesnerie [1995] to take account
of profit making economies) on no intermediate input taxation follows as a special case of
our model with profit taxation where all firms are subject to one-hundred percent profit
taxation with the tax proceeds being redistributed back to consumers as a demogrant.
In this sense, the recommended structure of intermediate input taxation also serves both
efficiency and redistributive objectives of the government and supports tax systems such
as VAT.
APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1. Smoothness of Yˆ t and Yˆ t
′
implies that H(p¯t, p¯t · yt(p¯t)) and
H(p¯t
′
, p¯t
′
· yt
′
(p¯t
′
)) are unique supporting hyperplanes for Y t and Y t
′
at yt(p¯t) and yt
′
(p¯t
′
),
respectively.
Step 1. Since p¯t and p¯t
′
are not collinear, H(p¯t, 0) is not a supporting hyperplane for
H≥(p¯
t′ , 0) and H(p¯t
′
, 0) is not a supporting hyperplane for H≥(p¯
t, 0) at 0N . This implies
that there exist ∆yt ∈ RN and ∆yt
′
∈ RN such that the following is true:29
∆yt ∈ H<(p¯
t, 0) ∩H≥(p¯
t′ , 0),
∆yt
′
∈ H<(p¯
t′ , 0) ∩H≥(p¯
t, 0), and
∆yt +∆yt
′
≫ 0N .
(A.1)
This implies that yt(p¯t) + yt
′
(p¯t
′
) + ∆yt + ∆yt
′
≫ y¯. Denote yt(p¯) by y¯t and yt
′
(p¯t
′
) by
y¯t
′
. Since y¯t and y¯t
′
belong to Yˆ t and Yˆ t
′
, Assumption 3 implies that f t(y¯t) = 0 and
f t
′
(y¯t
′
) = 0.
Step 2. Recall that ∇f t(y¯t) is defined as the linear mapping such that for all {hv} → 0N ,
we have
lim
hv→0N
f t(y¯t + hv)− [f t(y¯t) +∇f t(y¯t)hv]
|hv|
≡ lim
hv→0N
e(hv, y¯t)
|hv|
= 0, (A.2)
where e(hv, y¯t) = f t(y¯t+hv)− [f t(y¯t)+∇f t(y¯t)hv]. We show that there exists γt > 0 such
that ∇f t(y¯t) = γtp¯t. Take any point y ∈ Y t such that y 6= y¯t. Then, from the convexity
29 The intuition becomes clear when one sees Figure 1.
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of Y t, f t(y¯t + λ(y − y¯t)) ≤ 0 for all λ ∈ [0, 1]. Using (A.2) and the fact that f t(y¯t) = 0,
we have
∇f t(y¯t)(y − y¯t)
| y − y¯t |
= lim
λ→0
f t(y¯t + λ(y − y¯t))− f t(y¯t)
| y − y¯t |λ
= lim
λ→0
f t(y¯t + λ(y − y¯t))
| y − y¯t |λ
≤ 0. (A.3)
Since this is true for all y ∈ Y t, ∇f t(y¯t) is a normal to a supporting hyperplane of Y t at
y¯t. Since, Yˆ t is smooth and H(p¯t, p¯t · y¯t) is also a supporting hyperplane of Y t at y¯t, there
must exist γt > 0 such that ∇f t(y¯t) = γtp¯t. Similarly, we can prove that there exists
γt
′
> 0 such that ∇f t
′
(y¯t
′
) = γt
′
p¯t
′
.
Step 3. (A.3) implies that ∆yt · ∇f t(p¯t) < 0 and ∆yt
′
· ∇f t
′
(p¯t
′
) < 0. Choose a sequence
{λv} such that λv∆yt → 0 and λv > 0 for all v. We now show that there exists v′ such
that for all v > v′, we have yt
v
:= y¯t + λv∆yt ∈ Y t. From (A.2) we have
lim
λv→0
f t(y¯t + λv∆yt)− f t(y¯t)− λv∇f t(y¯t)∆yt
|∆yt |λv
= 0. (A.4)
Since f t(y¯t) = 0 and ∇f t(y¯t)∆yt < 0 (from Step 2), we have
lim
λv→0
f t(y¯t + λv∆yt)
|∆yt |λv
=
∇f t(y¯t)∆yt
|∆yt |
< 0. (A.5)
Hence, there exists a large enough v′ such that for all v > v′, we have f t(y¯t+ λv∆yt) < 0,
and hence yt
v
:= y¯t + λv∆yt ∈ intY t for all v > v′.30 Similarly, we can prove that there
exists v′′ such that for all v > v′′, we have yt
′v
:= y¯t
′
+ λv∆yt
′
∈ intY t
′
.
Step 4. We now show that there exist sequences {pt
v
} and {pt
′v
}, and a positive integer
vˆ such that for all v > vˆ, we have yt(pt
v
) + yt
′
(pt
′v
) ≫ y¯t + y¯t
′
. Define vˆ = max{v′, v′′}.
For every v > vˆ, yt
v
∈ Y t. It can therefore be shown that there are continuous maps
κt(yt
v
) := maxκ {κ ≥ 0
∣∣[ytv + κ1N ] ∈ Y t} and κt′(yt′v) := maxκ {κ ≥ 0
∣∣[yt′v + κ1N ] ∈
Y t
′
}.31 For all v > vˆ, it is clear that (i) yt
v
+ yt
′v
≫ y¯t + y¯t
′
and so (yt
v
+ κt(yt
v
)1N ) +
(yt
′v
+ κt
′
(yt
′v
)1N ) ≫ y¯t + y¯t
′
, (ii) (yt
v
+ κt(yt
v
)1N ) and (yt
′v
+ κt
′
(yt
′v
)1N ) belong to
Yˆ t and Yˆ t
′
, respectively, and (iii) {yt
v
+ κt(yt
v
)1N} → y¯t and {yt
′v
+ κt
′
(yt
′v
)1N} →
y¯t
′
. Define pt
v
= 1
γt
∇f t(yt
v
+ κt(yt
v
)1N ) and pt
′v
= 1
γt
′∇f t
′
(yt
′v
+ κt
′
(yt
′v
)1N ). The
smoothness of functions f t and f t
′
imply that {pt
v
} → p¯t and {pt
′v
} → p¯t
′
. Clearly,
yt(pt
v
) = yt
v
+ κt(yt
v
)1N and yt
′
(pt
′v
) = yt
′v
+ κt
′
(yt
′v
)1N , so that for all v > vˆ, we have
yt(pt
v
) + yt
′
(pt
′v
)≫ y¯t + y¯t
′
.
30 For any set A ⊂ Rn, intA is the interior of A relative to Rn.
31 Assumptions 1 and 2 guarantee the existence of such maps.
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Hence, for all v > vˆ, the conclusions of the lemma follow for sequences {pt
v
} and
{pt
′v
}.
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